Written by Ryan Morrison
How to Invest in Private Credit, and How It Compares With Private Equity
Based on a Navigating Wealth conversation with Katie Fowler.
How to Invest in Private Credit, and How It Compares With Private Equity
39% of investors in Long Angle's 2026 study hold private equity, 23% private credit. How to choose between them, and how individuals access private credit.
Ryan Morrison
If you can only allocate to one, choose by the job the money has to do: private credit pays contractual, usually floating-rate income with limited quarterly liquidity in the evergreen BDCs most individuals use, while private equity is a growth position that needs a long lockup and cash for capital calls. In Long Angle's 2026 High-Net-Worth Asset Allocation Report (233 member respondents, average net worth $17M, fielded December 2025 to January 2026), 39% held private equity investments and 23% held private credit, and among non-founders private equity averaged 13% of the private and alternatives portfolio against 6%. Respondents are Long Angle members, not a representative sample.
Key Takeaways
- In Long Angle's 2026 study of 233 member respondents, 39% held private equity investments and 23% held private credit, and private equity was twice private credit's share of the non-founder private and alternatives portfolio (13% vs 6%).
- Choose by the job: private credit pays contractual floating-rate income with some liquidity; private equity is a long-lockup bet on company growth.
- Founders already hold 61% of their private and alternatives portfolio in their own company, so for them private credit is the more different exposure.
- Individuals usually reach private credit through BDCs: listed ones trade daily but can sit 20 to 30% below NAV in stress; non-traded ones offer quarterly tenders typically capped at 5%.
- Katie Fowler of Blue Owl Capital attributes the fall in yields from low-teens to about 8 to 10% to rate cuts, not loan quality; she watches internal ratings, third-party marks and NAV discounts rather than trailing defaults.
2026 High-Net-Worth Asset Allocation Report
See how high-net-worth investors with an average net worth of $17M are allocating across public equities, private markets, real estate, bonds and cash. Based on benchmark data from 230+ respondents.

How Much Wealthy Investors Hold in Private Credit
Private credit is a smaller holding than private equity for most investors in Long Angle's data. In the 2026 High-Net-Worth Asset Allocation Report, 23% of respondents held private credit or direct loans, against 39% who held private equity investments. Nearly all of them, 94%, held some private or alternative asset.
| Private or alternative asset | % of respondents who hold it |
|---|---|
| Any private or alternative investment | 94% |
| Investment real estate | 64% |
| Crypto | 42% |
| Private equity investments | 39% |
| Venture capital | 26% |
| Angel investments | 23% |
| Private credit / direct loans | 23% |
| Hedge funds | 8% |
Source: Long Angle 2026 High-Net-Worth Asset Allocation Report, 233 respondents, average net worth $17M, fielded December 2025 to January 2026. Select all that apply; selected rows shown. Respondents are Long Angle members who chose to answer, not a representative sample of high-net-worth households.
By size of position the gap is wider. Among respondents without a large stake in their own company, private credit averaged 6% of the private and alternatives portfolio. Private equity investments averaged 13%, and private company equity as a whole 24%. The report puts it plainly: the allocation to private company equity is four times that of private credit.
| Holding | Average % of private and alternatives portfolio |
|---|---|
| Investment real estate | 42% |
| Private company equity (total) | 24% |
| Private equity investments | 13% |
| Angel investments | 6% |
| Venture capital | 5% |
| Other private company equity | 1% |
| Crypto | 13% |
| Other alternatives | 7% |
| Private credit | 6% |
| Precious metals | 5% |
| Hedge funds | 3% |
Source: Long Angle 2026 High-Net-Worth Asset Allocation Report, 233 respondents, average net worth $17M, fielded December 2025 to January 2026. Excludes founders, owners and private company employees with equity. Shares of the private and alternatives portfolio, not of total net worth. Private company equity sub-rows sum to 25% against the printed 24% total because of rounding. Respondents are Long Angle members who chose to answer, not a representative sample of high-net-worth households.
The report groups the two holdings by the job they do. Private credit sits with investment real estate in a yield and cash flow bucket, 48% of that portfolio combined. Private company equity sits with crypto in an upside bucket, 37% combined. The study does not split private credit by net worth, so it cannot say whether the share changes between $5M and $25M.
Private Equity or Private Credit: How to Decide If You Can Only Pick One
Neither is better in general. They are paid in different ways, they lock money up differently, and they fail differently, so the choice comes down to what the allocation has to do for you. This is education, not a recommendation of either asset class or of any fund.
| Question | Private credit | Private equity |
|---|---|---|
| Where the return comes from | Contractual interest, usually floating rate (SOFR plus a spread) | Growth in company value, realized at exit |
| Job in the portfolio | Income; grouped with real estate as yield and cash flow in Long Angle's 2026 report | Upside; grouped with crypto as upside potential in the same report |
| How individuals usually get access | Publicly traded or non-traded evergreen BDCs | Private equity funds, evergreen private equity funds and co-investments, usually for accredited or qualified investors |
| Liquidity | Daily for listed BDCs, at the market price; quarterly tenders, typically capped at 5% of assets, for non-traded BDCs | Traditional funds call capital over several years and return it as companies are sold; evergreen funds offer limited periodic liquidity |
| Position in a loss | Senior secured lender, ahead of the sponsor's equity; upside capped at the coupon | First-loss equity; full upside and full downside |
| Long Angle respondents who hold it | 23% | 39% (private equity investments) |
| Average share of private and alternatives portfolio | 6% | 13% (private equity investments) |
Source: Respondent figures: Long Angle 2026 High-Net-Worth Asset Allocation Report, 233 respondents, average net worth $17M, fielded December 2025 to January 2026. Portfolio shares exclude founders, owners and private company employees with equity. Structural descriptions are general and vary by fund. Respondents are Long Angle members who chose to answer, not a representative sample of high-net-worth households.
Five questions usually settle it:
- When might you need the money? If the answer is within a few years, private equity's lockup is the binding constraint. A listed BDC can be sold any day, though possibly at a discount to its net asset value.
- Do you need income now? Private credit pays interest as it goes. Private equity typically pays little until companies are sold.
- How much private company risk do you already carry? Founders and owners in Long Angle's 2026 study held 61% of their private and alternatives portfolio in their own company, and employees with equity 67%. For them, private equity adds more of a risk they already hold; private credit adds a different one. Long Angle's research on how much of their wealth entrepreneurs hold in private company equity covers this in more detail.
- Can you meet capital calls? A traditional private equity commitment is drawn down over several years, so the cash has to stay available. An evergreen BDC or an evergreen fund invests the money when you subscribe.
- Where would the income be taxed? Private credit interest is generally taxed as ordinary income, while private equity gains are generally taxed when realized. Which account holds the position can matter as much as which asset you pick; confirm the treatment with a tax professional.
Whichever you choose, the diligence questions later in this article apply: the manager's loss record against the yield or return generated, diversification, fund-level leverage, total fees, and how the liquidity offer is funded.
The Six Months That Shook Private Credit
Private credit has had a difficult six months in the press. Starting with high-profile bankruptcies in September 2025, through the Blue Owl OBDC2 wind-down narrative, through the SaaSpocalypse software exposure fears, the story being told is that private credit is the next systemic risk. Katie Fowler manages institutional and wealth channel relationships at Blue Owl Capital, one of the largest direct lenders in the world with over $150 billion in credit assets, and she has spent the past several months having a different version of this conversation with investors. Her argument is not that private credit is risk-free. It is that the specific risks investors are being told to worry about are largely not the risks present in the data.
The sequence of events that has driven the private credit narrative over the past six months is worth laying out precisely, because the narrative and the data have diverged at several key points.
In September 2025, First Brands and Tricolor filed for bankruptcy and fraud stemming from double-pledging of collateral made headlines. Jamie Dimon's subsequent "cockroach" comment, suggesting that where there are defaults, there are more to come, amplified the concern. What emerged later, and what received far less coverage, was that those borrowers were financed primarily by banks, not by non-bank private credit lenders. The framing had already set.
In November 2025, Blue Owl announced the cancellation of a planned merger between its private fund OBDC2 and its publicly listed vehicle OBDC. The publicly listed OBDC had been beaten down by the post-headlines sentiment, and investors in OBDC2 were unwilling to absorb a haircut to the lower public market price. Blue Owl instead committed to an orderly wind-down of OBDC2 on a pro-rata basis: a return of capital rather than a fire sale.
By January 2026, the emergence of Claude Code and broader AI acceleration raised the SaaSpocalypse question. Given that approximately 20 to 25% of direct lending exposure sits in software companies, the question became: if software businesses are being disrupted by AI at scale, what does that mean for their ability to service private credit debt? The concern was legitimate in framing, even if the underlying loan-level data did not support the apocalyptic conclusion.
The past several weeks have added a wave of elevated redemption requests across major BDC managers. Blackstone funded $150 million of its own principals' capital to meet a full 7.9% tender. BlackRock held the line at the standard 5%. Cliffwater reported 10%+ redemption requests. None of these responses generated favorable press. The asset manager narrative (that gates exist precisely for scenarios like this, that the underlying loans continue to perform, and that forced selling of sound assets helps no one) has struggled to get traction against the simpler story.
Watch the Full Conversation
This article draws on a Navigating Wealth conversation with Katie Fowler, where we discuss what the data shows about private credit loan quality, how redemption gates work, and what individual investors should be looking at to evaluate their private credit exposure. Watch the full episode for the broader discussion.
Subscribe on YouTube · Get weekly episode updates
Katie Fowler is a Managing Director at Blue Owl Capital, where she manages wealth and institutional channel relationships for Blue Owl's direct lending business. Blue Owl manages over $150 billion in credit assets and its flagship OCIC vehicle is the second-largest of its kind at $34 billion. She joined Blue Owl at its founding roughly ten years ago and has spent her career focused specifically on direct lending.
What Is Direct Lending and How Are These Loans Structured
Direct lending is the practice of non-bank lenders making loans directly to companies, typically to finance private equity-led leveraged buyouts, without going through a bank syndicate or public bond market. It has existed for decades, but its current scale is a post-GFC phenomenon.
Before the 2008 financial crisis, large-scale LBO financing ran primarily through bank balance sheets, which would then syndicate that risk to third-party institutional buyers through the broadly syndicated loan market. Post-GFC regulatory changes, particularly capital charges that made it increasingly costly for banks to hold leveraged lending risk on their balance sheets, created a structural gap. Non-bank lenders like Blue Owl filled it. Direct lending now represents approximately 25% of all below-investment-grade US corporate credit, most of that growth representing a share shift away from bank syndication rather than net new credit creation.
The structural terms of direct loans differ meaningfully from publicly syndicated alternatives. Direct lenders hold loans to maturity on their own balance sheet, which allows them to negotiate more lender-friendly documentation than a bank preparing to syndicate risk to hundreds of CLO vehicles. The key structural features:
First lien senior secured position: the lender is first in line against company assets in a default scenario. The loan sits at the top of the capital structure. At a typical 40% loan-to-value, the PE sponsor's equity represents 60% of the total enterprise value, sitting beneath the debt. In a default scenario, enterprise value would need to decline by more than 60% before the lender's principal is impaired.
Illiquidity premium: direct lenders charge approximately 2% additional spread over what equivalent companies pay in the broadly syndicated loan market. This compensates investors for holding an instrument they cannot sell daily.
Negative incurrence covenants: direct loan documents prohibit borrowers from taking specific actions, such as raising additional debt, making acquisitions, or moving pledged collateral, without lender approval. These protections are stronger than what is available in publicly traded loan markets.
Recovery rates: Blue Owl's historical recovery in default scenarios runs approximately 70 cents on the dollar. This reflects both the senior secured position and the ability of a concentrated lender to engage directly with the borrower and sponsor rather than navigating a fragmented syndicate.
Loss rate: across Blue Owl's direct lending business since inception ten years ago, the annualized credit loss rate has run approximately 8 basis points. That is a low number relative to the yield these loans generate.
Why Private Credit Returns Are Falling, and Why That Is Not the Problem
The most widespread misconception driving investor concern right now is that declining private credit returns signal deteriorating loan quality. They do not. They reflect interest rate mechanics.
Direct lending loans are floating rate instruments. Their yield is calculated as SOFR plus a spread. When SOFR was elevated, in 2023 and 2024, it was possible for first lien senior secured loans to produce low-teens yields. Those were unusually high absolute returns for the risk profile involved. The Fed has since cut rates by approximately 2%, and credit spreads have also normalized modestly as market conditions improved and competition from returning bank lenders increased. The result is current yields in the 8 to 10% range.
There is an irony worth understanding. Higher absolute yields in 2023 and 2024 represented a more stressful environment for borrowers, who were paying significantly more to service their debt. The concern at the time was whether borrowers could afford such elevated interest payments. Today, with rates lower and spreads compressed, borrowers are on stronger fundamental footing. Interest coverage ratios in Blue Owl's diversified book have improved from a trough of 1.7 times during peak rates to 2.1 times currently. The borrowers are in better shape. The yield is lower because the macro environment, specifically the rate environment, improved.
Investors who became accustomed to 13% returns in 2023 and are now seeing 9% are not observing a deterioration in the quality of their allocation. They are observing a rate cycle. The relative comparison that matters is not 9% versus 13%. It is 9% versus what high-yield bonds or broadly syndicated loans are yielding over the same period, with materially weaker structural protections.
BDC Investing: How the Structures Work and What Redemption Gates Mean
Business development companies are the primary vehicle through which individual investors access private direct lending. Understanding how the two main BDC structures work is essential to interpreting the recent redemption headlines accurately.
Publicly traded BDCs list on a stock exchange and trade at market prices that fluctuate independent of the underlying loan portfolio's value. During periods of market stress, publicly traded BDCs often trade at 20 to 30% discounts to their net asset value. That discount reflects investor sentiment and market liquidity, not a write-down of the underlying loans. A publicly traded BDC trading at 80 cents on the dollar does not mean its loan book is worth 80 cents; it means the public market is attaching a significant illiquidity discount to the vehicle at that moment.
Non-traded evergreen BDCs operate differently. They price at or near NAV and offer quarterly tender windows, typically 5% of fund assets per quarter. This structure was specifically designed to provide individual investors with periodic liquidity while protecting the fund from forced selling of illiquid loans. The gate is not a penalty. It is the mechanism that allows the manager to continue deploying capital in illiquid instruments while offering some liquidity to investors who need it.
The recent elevated redemption requests, Blackstone meeting its full 7.9% tender by funding $150 million from its own principals' pockets, BlackRock holding firmly at the standard 5%, Blue Owl proceeding with an orderly pro-rata wind-down of OBDC2, represent three different but reasonable responses to the same stress scenario. Each was operating within the stated terms of its fund documents. None of them was a signal that the underlying loans had deteriorated. They were signals that retail sentiment had turned negative and that redemption pressure was exceeding normal quarterly capacity.
The BREIT comparison is instructive. Blackstone's real estate fund went through a period of elevated redemptions in 2022 and 2023 as real estate sentiment soured. It managed through the gates, continued to perform, and has since seen net inflows from the same wealth investor base that initially drove the redemption pressure. Private credit appears to be going through a structurally similar cycle. For more on how these BDC and private credit structures compare to hedge fund vehicles, the post on hedge fund minimums and access mechanics covers the parallel dynamics in the alternative credit space.
The Software Exposure Question
Software represents approximately 20% of the direct lending market, and the SaaSpocalypse narrative raises a legitimate forward-looking question: if AI displaces meaningful revenue from software companies over the next three to five years, what does that mean for the debt sitting on those companies' balance sheets?
The framing matters before the risk can be assessed clearly. The software companies in direct lending portfolios are not early-stage SaaS businesses with thin customer relationships and a generic product. They are primarily large, PE-owned, vertically integrated enterprise software businesses with deep domain expertise in specific niches, owned by institutional PE sponsors with significant equity committed to the same businesses. Blue Owl approved approximately 5% of the loans its originators brought to investment committee, an intentionally high selectivity threshold.
More importantly, AI disruption risk in software is not new information that markets are processing for the first time. ChatGPT launched four years ago. Blue Owl has been underwriting AI displacement risk as part of its standard software diligence process for years. The companies most at risk, horizontally commoditized tools with no proprietary data or workflow lock-in, are the ones that would not typically pass a direct lending investment committee's bar for PE-sponsored, upper-middle-market lending.
The capital structure argument also provides meaningful context. At 40% loan-to-value, a 20% decline in the enterprise value of a software borrower does not impair the lender's position. A 40% decline does not impair it either. The equity sponsors sitting below the debt have committed more capital to the same businesses than the lenders have; they are the first loss position and have every incentive to support the business before it reaches a default scenario.
What Investors Should Watch as Forward-Looking Signals
Trailing default rates are the wrong metric for evaluating the current health of a private credit portfolio. Defaults, by definition, reflect problems that materialized in the past. The useful signals are forward-looking and available in public filings for investors willing to look.
Internal loan ratings. Blue Owl publicly discloses its 1-through-5 internal rating distribution in its BDC 10-Q filings. A rating of 1 means the borrower is outperforming underwriting expectations; 5 means the borrower is in genuine distress. Currently, 3-through-5 rated names represent approximately 5% of Blue Owl's OCIC book and have been consistent at that level for several quarters. If that percentage begins to creep upward, even without an accompanying rise in formal defaults, it is a meaningful early warning signal. The same logic applies to any BDC that publicly discloses its internal rating schema.
Third-party marks. Blue Owl's OCIC portfolio is marked monthly by an independent third-party valuation agent. The weighted average mark of the privately originated book has shown very little movement over the past 12 months and currently sits at par less original issue discount, typically around 98 cents. If the average mark begins to drift meaningfully below that level, into the mid-90s and lower, that is a signal of potential future concern that precedes formal default disclosure. Critically, these are third-party marks, not self-reported values; the $1.4 billion loan sale at 99.7 cents on the dollar referenced in the OBDC2 process provided external validation of Blue Owl's marking approach. Long Angle's Q1 2026 private credit market perspective examines these signals in more detail across the broader market.
Natural repayment rate. Direct lending portfolios generate 6 to 8% natural quarterly repayment as loans mature and are refinanced. This is the liquidity cushion that supports the 5% quarterly tender structure. A manager who offers 5% quarterly redemptions and generates 6 to 8% in natural repayments does not need to sell assets to fund redemptions in a normal environment. Watching whether the natural repayment rate holds gives investors a real-time read on the underlying portfolio's health and the fund's capacity to meet obligations without forced selling.
BDC NAV discounts. A publicly traded BDC trading at a 25% discount to NAV is not signaling that its loans are worth 75 cents. It is signaling market sentiment and the price of illiquidity at that moment. Some long-horizon investors have treated wide discounts as entry points, but a discount can persist or widen, and on its own it says nothing about the loans inside the vehicle.
How Individual Investors Access Private Credit
Individual investors can access private credit through business development companies (BDCs), including both publicly traded and non-traded evergreen vehicles. Publicly traded BDCs offer daily liquidity but trade at discounts to NAV during market stress. Non-traded evergreen vehicles typically offer quarterly redemption windows of up to 5% of assets. Both structures provide exposure to first lien senior secured corporate loans with yields in the 8 to 10% range when this conversation was recorded, according to Fowler.
There are two primary paths for individual investors seeking private credit exposure, and the right choice depends on liquidity needs and holding period.
Publicly traded BDCs trade on major stock exchanges and require no minimum investment beyond the cost of a share. They offer daily liquidity and transparent pricing, but they carry the volatility of public market sentiment and will trade at discounts to NAV during stress periods.
Non-traded evergreen BDCs are designed for the wealth channel and typically require minimum investments in the $25,000 to $50,000 range, with qualification as an accredited investor. They price at or close to NAV, offer quarterly tender windows of up to 5% of assets, and aim to closely replicate the institutional direct lending experience for individual investors. The trade-off is reduced liquidity compared to publicly traded alternatives.
For investors evaluating either path, the due diligence checklist that matters most is: the manager's track record on credit losses relative to the yield generated; portfolio diversification by borrower, sector, and loan size; leverage ratios at the fund level; fee structure and total expense ratio; and the mechanics of the liquidity offering, specifically what natural repayment rate supports the redemption capacity. Long Angle's Private Credit Investment Guide 2026 walks through this evaluation framework in detail, including how to benchmark a private credit manager's performance against relevant liquid market alternatives.
For how private credit sits next to equities, real estate and other alternatives, the sections above draw on the 2026 High-Net-Worth Asset Allocation Report, which covers allocation patterns across 233 respondents.
Final Thoughts
At the time of recording, private credit is going through a period of genuine stress in terms of investor sentiment and redemption pressure. The loan portfolios underlying the major BDC vehicles are, by the measures that matter most, performing in line with or better than historical expectations. That distinction matters for investors trying to decide whether to hold, add to, or exit their private credit allocation.
The specific risks worth monitoring are real but different from the ones generating the most headlines. Rate normalization explains the yield decline. Software exposure at 40% LTV with PE sponsor equity beneath it is not the apocalyptic scenario that the SaaSpocalypse framing implies. Redemption gates are functioning as designed. The data is there for investors willing to read the filings.
If the question is which one to own at all, start from the job the money has to do and how much private company risk you already carry. Investors in Long Angle's 2026 data hold private equity more often and in larger amounts, but private credit is the holding that pays as it goes and that diversifies a founder's existing concentration.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is private credit and how does it work?
Private credit refers to loans made directly by non-bank lenders to companies, bypassing public bond and loan markets. The dominant strategy within private credit is direct lending, which typically finances private equity-led leveraged buyouts with first lien senior secured loans. Lenders earn a floating rate return (SOFR plus a spread) and an illiquidity premium of approximately 2% over comparable publicly traded instruments.
What are typical private credit returns in 2026?
When this conversation was recorded (published July 2026), Katie Fowler of Blue Owl Capital put direct lending yields at roughly 8 to 10%, down from low-teens levels in 2023 and 2024 when SOFR was higher. In her view the decline reflects Fed rate cuts and spread normalization rather than weaker loans. Yields move with interest rates and are not a forecast of what any fund will return; compare them with high-yield bonds and broadly syndicated loans over the same period.
What is a BDC and how do redemption gates work?
A business development company is a regulated investment vehicle that provides individual investors with access to private credit strategies. Publicly traded BDCs offer daily liquidity but trade at market prices that can diverge significantly from underlying NAV. Non-traded evergreen BDCs offer quarterly redemption windows, typically capped at 5% of fund assets per quarter. The quarterly gate is a structural feature designed to prevent forced selling of illiquid loan portfolios when redemption demand spikes, protecting investors who remain in the fund. It is not a signal that the underlying portfolio is impaired.
Are private credit default rates rising in 2026?
Default rates in the corporate credit market are running at approximately 2 to 3% based on third-party data from Kroll and Fitch, which is broadly average for the credit cycle. Selective upper-middle-market direct lenders with PE sponsor-backed borrowers have historically performed meaningfully better than broad market default rates, reflecting the structural protections, loan-to-value discipline, and sponsor equity cushion present in that segment.
How does direct lending differ from high-yield bonds?
Direct lending loans are privately originated, held to maturity, first lien senior secured, and documented with stronger lender protections than publicly traded high-yield bonds. They carry less liquidity but have historically delivered higher yields, lower default rates, and higher recovery rates in default scenarios. High-yield bonds trade in public markets, offer daily liquidity, are typically rated by a rating agency, and are more susceptible to broad market sentiment swings.
What should I look for when evaluating a private credit fund?
Key evaluation criteria: the manager's historical credit loss rate relative to the yield generated; borrower diversification (no single name exceeding 2% of the portfolio); portfolio-level leverage; fee structure; and the liquidity mechanics supporting the redemption offering. Forward-looking signals include the distribution of internal loan ratings disclosed in BDC filings and the trend in third-party portfolio marks. A manager whose 3-through-5 rated names are stable and whose marks are holding near par is in a fundamentally different position than one where both metrics are deteriorating.
If I can only allocate to one, should I choose private equity or private credit?
Choose by what the money has to do. Private credit suits income needs and a shorter or uncertain horizon, and it diversifies investors who already hold a lot of private company equity. Private equity suits a long horizon, spare cash for capital calls and a goal of growth. In Long Angle's 2026 study of 233 member respondents, 39% held private equity investments and 23% held private credit. Respondents are Long Angle members, not a representative sample.
How much of their portfolio do wealthy investors hold in private credit?
In Long Angle's 2026 High-Net-Worth Asset Allocation Report (233 member respondents, average net worth $17M), 23% held private credit or direct loans. Among respondents without large stakes in their own companies, private credit averaged 6% of the private and alternatives portfolio, against 13% for private equity investments and 42% for investment real estate. The study does not split private credit by net worth.
How can I invest in private credit as an individual?
Most individuals use business development companies (BDCs). Publicly traded BDCs need no minimum beyond the price of a share and trade daily, but can trade well below net asset value in stress. Non-traded evergreen BDCs price at or near net asset value, typically require $25,000 to $50,000 and accredited investor status, and offer quarterly tenders usually capped at 5% of fund assets. Check the manager's loss record, diversification, leverage, fees and how redemptions are funded.
Navigating a market dislocation in an asset class requires peer-level intelligence, not just manager commentary.
Long Angle's Trusted Circles and Community provide members with the peer diligence and collective intelligence to evaluate private credit positions, share what they are seeing across managers, and make more informed allocation decisions.
More From Long Angle
Beyond Wealth Newsletter
Navigating Wealth Podcast
Research & Studies
Alternative Investment Education
Blog



